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ABSTRACT 
 
 
While the volume of literature dealing with openness and growth is 
impressive, relatively few studies tackle the relationship between openness 
and investment in the emerging markets. This study attempts to determine the 
impact of openness to international trade on capital formation and whether 
such impact is any different for emerging markets than it is for developed 
countries. For the purpose of this study, six countries are selected: Canada, 
United States and United Kingdom for developed countries and Hungary, 
Thailand and India for emerging markets. Data over a twenty-year period is 
collected, ranging from 1983 to 2003. The openness to trade is measured in 
terms of the share of total trade in the GDP. An empirical model is specified 
and time-series regressions are employed individually for each country in 
question, using GDP per capita and population as control variables. Findings 
indicate that the impact of openness on capital formation is positive for all 
selected countries, but larger and more significant for emerging markets. 
These findings are substantiated by local market conditions and the advances 
in the telecommunication and information technologies throughout the sample 
period.  
 
 
Malgré le fait que le volume des études qui s’intéressent à la relation entre 
l’ouverture et la croissance économique est immense, relativement peu 
d'études traitent de la relation entre l’ouverture économique et 
l’investissement dans les marchés émergents. Cette étude essaye de 
déterminer l'impact de l’ouverture au commerce internationale sur la formation 
du capital, ainsi que de vérifier si cet impact est différent pour les marchés 
émergents que pour les pays développés. Dans cette étude, six pays sont 
choisis: le Canada, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis comme pays 
développés ensuite l'Hongrie, la Thaïlande et l’Inde comme marchés 
émergents. Les données couvrant une période de vingt ans sont recueillies, 
soit de 1983 à 2003. L’ouverture au commerce internationale dans un pays se 
mesure par la part des échanges commerciaux totaux dans le PIB. Un 
modèle empirique est spécifié et des régressions (séries temporelles) 
individuelles sont effectuées pour chaque pays en question. Le PIB par 
habitant et la population sont utilisés comme variables de contrôle. Les 
résultats indiquent que l’impact de l’ouverture au commerce internationale sur 
l’investissement est positif pour tous les pays choisis, mais plus grand et plus 
significatif pour les marchés émergents, Cela s’explique par les conditions 
des marchés locaux et l’essor  des technologies de télécommunication et 
d’information pendant la période étudiée. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The suggestion that openness to international trade is amongst the vehicles of 
economic growth dates back to the 19th century. From mid-century protectionist 
economic policies in a number of developing nations to today’s gradual collapse of trade 
barriers, policymakers and economists changed their views regarding the significance of 
openness to trade considerably throughout the 20th century. Faced with the perspective of 
a global village, it is nothing but natural to question the dynamics that questionably link 
economic growth and a nation’s openness to international trade. The notion that openness 
to international trade fuels growth via technological change has been explored heavily in 
the economic literature. A large scope of studies examines whether openness to 
international trade bears a favorable impact on the growth of gross domestic product, yet 
the results yield uncertain conclusions. Although a considerable number of such studies 
do find positive openness-growth relationships, the robustness of such results often 
comes under crossfire1.  
 
Studies dealing with the impact of openness on economic growth concentrate on 
gross domestic product and do relatively little to examine the standalone impact of 
openness to international trade on investment, a significant component of the GDP. 
Furthermore, although several studies do examine the impact of economic openness on 
capital formation in developed and developing countries, little has been done in a way to 
determine the significance of such an impact in emerging markets as a part of a 
comparative study. It is of interest to research into the relationship between openness to 
trade and investment for a number of reasons. First, not only would such knowledge 
beneficially contribute to the development of capital markets, but also to the development 
of markets for capital goods. Second, since investment is a vehicle for technological 
transfer, in-depth knowledge of the investment process converted into policy would 
significantly contribute to the economic development in the emerging markets.  
 
                                                 
1 See section III below. 
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Using its prevalent definition, an emerging market refers to economic activity in a 
nation that is currently in a transitional stage between a developing and a developed 
status2. Such countries are restructuring their economies along market-oriented lines and 
offer a wealth of revealed opportunities in trade, technology transfers, and foreign direct 
investment. The aim of this study is to attempt to determine the significance of the impact 
of openness to commodity trade flows on capital formation, as well as to determine 
whether such an impact is any different for economies classified as emerging markets 
than it is for developed nations.  
 
The study proceeds by first providing a more detailed insight on the nature of the 
variables used, as well as an account of the methodology involved. Next, a number of 
methodologies and results obtained by previous studies are presented. Subsequently, the 
study addresses the underlying theoretical evidence and implications of openness on 
international trade, as well as its effects on other economic variables and then 
theoretically justifies the statistical model to be used. This is followed by an empirical 
analysis, for the purpose of which six nations will be selected. Among these countries, 
United States, Canada and United Kingdom are classified as developed nations while 
Thailand, Hungary and India are classified as emerging markets. Individual time-series 
regressions will then be conducted on pertinent data collected for each country over a 20 
year period, along with the necessary statistical tests, namely the unit root, cointegration 
and autocorrelation tests. Finally, the findings will be discussed as a part of a comparison 
between the two groups of countries and conclusions will be drawn.   
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Morgan Stanley Capital International 
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II. Pertinent Information 
In order to gain a better understanding of the difference between developing 
nations and emerging markets it is essential to understand the two main potential causes 
responsible for the rise of emerging markets: failure of state-controlled economic 
development and a need for capital investment. First, state-led economic development 
failed to produce sustainable growth in the traditional developing countries, which 
pressed these countries to adopt more open policies, and to facilitate economic growth 
along market-oriented, rather than state-controlled lines. Second, the developing counties 
greatly needed capital to finance their development, but traditional government 
borrowing failed to effectively contribute to the development process. Borrowing from 
commercial banks or foreign governments and multilateral lenders, such as the IMF, 
resulted in a debt overload and a major economic imbalance. As a result of these 
inefficiencies, developing countries began to rely on equity investment as a vehicle of 
financing economic growth. In order to attract equity financing, a developing nation has 
to establish the preconditions of a market economy and create a business climate that 
meets the expectations of foreign investors. This change in financing sources thus 
became another factor leading to the rise of emerging markets.  
 
For the purpose of this study, the selected emerging markets are Thailand, India 
and Hungary. Although these countries are significantly different in terms of size and 
nature of their economies, such a selection is geared at countering the effects of any 
regional trends, had the selection been made within a single geographic region. As for the 
developed nations, the United States, Canada and United Kingdom, all members of the 
G8, are selected due to their well-developed, powerful economies and their establishment 
as global players in the field of international trade. This study uses country-specific data 
over a 20-year period, ranging from 1984 through 2003. This period was marked by a 
number of significant trade agreements such as the 1994 WTO Agreement and the many 
multilateral trade agreements deriving from it, particularly the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), the Antidumping and Subsidies Code, the General 
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Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Throughout this period, our countries of interest 
have experienced a fairly steady increase in their capital formation to GDP ratio, with the 
exception of Thailand, in which case the capital formation underwent an immense shock, 
reaching nearly 40% of its GDP in 1996 and than falling sharply during the East Asian 
crisis of the late 1990’s. 
 
FIGURE 1 – Capital Formation as a share of GDP in selected countries: 1984-2004 
Capital Formation share of GDP 
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Thailand’s sharp fall in capital formation was a result of a deep recession: as export 
growth - previously a key driver of the Thai economy - collapsed in 1996, resulting in the 
floating of the exchange rate by the central bank, consequently triggering a sharp increase 
in foreign liabilities that the strapped-for-cash Thai firms were already having trouble 
repaying.  
 
As may be seen from Fig. 1, the economies classified as emerging markets have 
been experiencing a more intense growth of capital formation as a share of GDP in the 
last several years than the developed nations. However, despite such growth among these 
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economies, India, unlike Thailand and Hungary, did not exhibit as sharp an increase in its 
economic openness during the last decade, as may be seen in Fig. 2  
 
FIGURE 2 – Economic openness indicator in selected countries: 1984-2004  
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India’s lagging growth in economic openness, which reflects a slower foreign market 
penetration, may be attributed to the fact that India undertook a major step towards trade 
liberalization only in 1991, when a government program reduced trade barriers and 
removed investment restrictions across industries. A strong extent of protection is still 
present in the economy. Nevertheless, India does exhibit a stronger upward trend in its 
economic openness than the developed countries do. Whether such growth of capital 
formation share of GDP is correlated with openness to commodity trade flows remains to 
be determined. However, before proceeding, it is de rigueur to examine the earlier 
literature that deals with the issue.  
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III. Literature Review 
 
The suggestion that foreign market penetration has a positive impact on a 
domestic country’s GDP growth is not a new one. In contrast to the earlier neoclassical 
growth models, such as those developed by Sollow (1956), Cass (1965) and Koopmans 
(1965), later theories suggest that openness to international trade affects economic growth 
through technological improvement. A number of scholars, such as Romer (1992), 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) suggest that such 
technological improvement stems from the spillover of technology embedded in foreign 
goods and services. While some empirical studies such as Sachs and Warner (1995) and 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) do indeed find robust positive relationships between international 
trade and growth, other scholars, such as Harrison and Hanson (1999) and O’Rourke 
(2000) do not.  There is still disagreement among economists concerning how a country's 
international economic policies and its growth of GDP and capital formation interact, 
even despite a number of multi-country case studies employing large cross-country data 
sets and analytical frameworks, as well as theoretical advances in growth theory. 
 
 
 Although relatively few studies are geared to determine the standalone impact of 
openness of international trade on capital formation, some arguments are nevertheless 
present in the literature. Aitken and Harrison (1999), perform a panel data analysis to 
determine the effects of foreign market penetration into the Venezuelan economy on the 
performance of domestic firms. This is done in order to attempt to question Venezuelan 
government’s efforts to promote foreign direct investment in order to achieve 
“technology spillovers”. Their findings indicate that an increase in productivity, although 
significant, is only applicable to joint ventures and that foreign competition has in fact a 
negative effect on the productivity of firms that are entirely domestically owned. 
Although similar studies done earlier did not find such a robust negative relationship, 
Aitken and Harrison point out that multinational corporations tend to choose the more 
productive sectors which are not necessarily representative of the economy as a whole. 
The main reasoning behind Aitken and Harrison’s study is that openness to international 
trade and consequently a higher foreign direct investment naturally increases 
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international competition, which in turn may cause domestic investment to decline. They 
argue that such a decline would exceed the increase of capital formation fueled by foreign 
capital inflows, resulting in an overall decrease in capital formation. Similarly, they find 
no evidence supporting the existence of technology spillovers from foreign to domestic 
firms.  
 
There are nevertheless a number of shortcomings in Aitken and Harrison’s study. 
The primary concern is the time period used for panel analysis. Data from 1976 to 1989 
does not necessarily represent the situation in the world today as markets grow 
increasingly more integrated with time. Another concern is that Venezuela does not 
necessarily adequately reflect other developing nations, as the scope for technological 
spillovers is certainly larger in export-oriented economies, such as the East-Asian 
economies. In fact, effects may vary for those nations whose development levels are 
either lower or higher than Venezuela. Furthermore, the study fails to gauge the long-
term effects of openness: negative effects can only be transitory as markets continue to 
integrate throughout time. Finally, the study does not account for the eventual possibility 
of domestic technological spillover via labor mobility, as suggested by Yih-Chyi Chiang 
(1998). 
 
One area which seems to produce a fair share of disagreement among scholars 
conducting openness-growth studies is the very concept of openness. A large number of 
measures of openness have been used throughout time: from the simple trade share of 
GDP used in this study to much more complex indicators that reflect trade policies. One 
particularly interesting study was done by Sebastian Edwards in 1998. He tests the 
robustness of the relationship between the following nine measures of openness and total 
factor productivity growth: 1) a ratio of taxes on imports and exports to total trade, 2) 
subjective index of trade distortions proposed by the Heritage Foundation 3) index of 
openness based on residuals from regressions explaining trade flows conceived by 
Edward Leamer in 1988,  4) Holger Wolf’s (1993) regression-based index of import 
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distortions 5) average levels of import tariffs calculated by UNCTAD3 6) average 
coverage of non-tariff trade barriers calculated by UNCTAD 7) World Bank 
classification of trade strategies 8) Warner-Sachs trade policy index and 9) average black 
market premium on a nation’s foreign exchange rate. Edwards performs a regression of 
these openness measure on estimated of ten-year averages of total factor productivity for 
a time span between 1960 and 1990. The sample consists of 93 countries, including both 
developed and developing nations. Edwards finds that six out of the above nine measure 
of openness are statistically significant in the anticipated sense.  
  
A quandary with Edwards’ results is that they are very contingent upon the fact 
that his regressions are weighted by the per-capita GDP.  In fact, a more careful scrutiny 
of Edwards’ work performed by Rodriguez and Rodrik in 2001 has revealed that if the 
per-capita GDP used by Edwards is weighted by its logarithm, only five of the openness 
measures return significant. Furthermore, they have discovered that the usage of White’s 
correction for heteroskedasticity that number decreases further to four: the World Bank 
classification of trade strategies, the subjective index of trade distortions proposed by the 
Heritage Foundation, the  black market premium on a country’s foreign exchange rate 
and the a ratio of taxes on imports and exports to total trade. There are further problems 
with the remaining measures of openness: it would seem that changes in the exchange 
rate premium are influenced more by rudimentary macroeconomic policies, rather than 
trade policies. Finally, the Heritage Foundation openness indicator was calculated for 
trade barriers that existed in 1996, while Edward’s study covers the 1980s: it is thus 
unclear that the regression will yield satisfactory results if the index was based on the 
1980s data. Edward’s study demonstrates that even though evidence of a positive 
correlation between openness and growth exists, no particular measure of openness may 
be deemed as ideal and absolute; therefore it is not inappropriate to use the simple total 
trade to GDP ratio for the purposes of this study.  
 
                                                 
3 Same as used by Barro and Lee (1994) 
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Yet another study that attempted to break loose from the rest by employing an 
innovative measure of openness to international trade – is a study conducted by Jeffrey 
Frankel and David Romer in 1999. While this study does not deal directly with capital 
formation, it is nevertheless of interest for its inventive openness indicator.  Frankel and 
Romer suggest that most studies that use the total trade share of GDP as a measure of 
openness find a positive relationship between openness and per-capita income. They 
point out however, that countries whose incomes are high for reasons unrelated to trade 
may have high trade ratios - the trade shares may be endogenous and therefore a more 
sophisticated measure of openness may be required. Frankel and Romer thus propose 
obtaining instrumental variables estimates of trade’s effect on income by incorporating 
geographic characteristics of countries. The following variables are thus included in the 
trade equation:  the size of countries, their distance from each other, whether they share a 
border, and whether they are landlocked. Frankel and Romer conclude that there is no 
evidence that the positive effect of trade on growth is overstated by previously used 
indicators. Furthermore, they argue that the consequences of geographic differences in 
trade are indicative of policy-based differences. The measure proposed by Frankel and 
Romer, however, may not necessarily be a valid instrumental variable, since a country’s 
geographic situation may affect economic growth via a number of channels other than 
trade. Similarly, a country’s geographic location may place it into a relative disadvantage, 
for example, via lowering its productivity through infectious diseases abundant in an area 
or by an excessively harsh climate, thus ultimately affecting economic growth. 
Nevertheless, Frankel and Romer’s study is suggestive that the use of an openness 
measure that is based exclusively on the trade share of GDP yields comparable results to 
the use of a similar measure completed with the addition of geographic parameters. In 
turn, this may suggest that using an economic openness indicator based on the trade share 
of GDP is adequate. 
 
A work of particular interest was performed by Jang Jin in 2004. Although not 
predominantly concerned with growth of capital formation rather than GDP growth, this 
study is nevertheless of interest because of the research methodology employed and 
because of Jin’s findings regarding several landlocked Chinese provinces. Jin collects the 
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real GDP per capita, real capital formation and total employment for each Chinese 
province. His data ranges from 1978 to 1998. Jin than calculates an openness indicator 
for each province in each period, using the share of trade in the GDP as a measure of 
openness.  Using employment and capital formation as control variables, Jin conducts 
independent time series regressions for each province in order to test the hypothesis that 
openness positively affects GDP growth.  He finds that in most cases there is indeed a 
positive significant relationship between the extent of openness to international trade and 
output growth. Interestingly enough, he finds that in the case of certain landlocked 
provinces, the relationship between openness and economic growth is negative and 
significant. Jin attributes that finding to the inability of these provinces to compete 
internationally, thus leading to a decrease in domestic investment that is greater than the 
increase in foreign investment, in turn causing the overall capital formation to decrease. 
This is theoretically sound and consistent with the argument brought forth by Aitken and 
Harrison (1999). The methodology employed by Jin is equally interesting. As he is 
dealing with time-series, Jin employs the augmented Dickey-Fuller test to check for a 
presence of a unit root among the variables and upon discovery of such, corrects the 
problem with first differencing his variables, thus transforming them into first differences 
of logarithm. He further conducts an Engel-Granger cointegration test in order to test 
whether variables that possess a unit root share a common stochastic tendency. Since 
Jin’s methodology appears to be most fitting and appropriate for the aims of a study on 
openness and capital formation, elements of this methodology will therefore be adopted. 
 
All the same, Jin’s study is not without its areas of concern. One of them is that 
the measure of openness chosen by Jin is based on trade flows and does a poor job 
accounting for the liberalization of capital markets. Since GDP growth is partly 
dependant on the growth of capital formation, an increase of openness in the capital 
markets may positively affect GDP growth through foreign direct investment. Jin is 
careful, however, to point out that “As an alternative to trade openness, it will also be 
desirable to include foreign direct investment as a proxy for financial market openness, 
but provincial data are not available. Readily available are trade data.”4. Another area of 
                                                 
4 See p. 1573 
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concern is that little effort has been made in order to determine if a feedback effect is 
present. Jin also notes that Granger causality is not examined because “Granger causal 
models that are involved with distributed lag structures deplete degrees of freedom 
quickly and the causal relationships in this case may appear to be distorted and 
insignificant perhaps due to degrees of freedom problem.”5   
 
 
 Another interesting study was performed by Levine and Renelt (1992). 
Employing extreme bound analysis (EBA) proposed by Leamer (1983, 1985) in order to 
test the robustness of coefficient estimates to alternations in the conditioning information, 
they have conducted cross-country regressions on a 119 country sample in order to assess 
the statistical sensitivity of a number of past findings. Their data ranges from 1960 to 
1989. Levine and Renelt use a large number of variables that have been the focus of 
attention in a broad collection of earlier growth studies. The study examines the statistical 
relationship between economic growth and a wide array of indicators that reflect 
economic policy. Levine and Renelt consider a relationship between growth and a 
variable of interest to be robust if it remains statistically significant and maintains a sign 
predicted by theory even after the conditioning set of variables in the regression has been 
changed. Among their findings, they conclude that a positive robust relationship exists 
between average share of capital formation in the GDP and the average share of trade in 
the GDP. Similarly, they confirm the existence of a positive robust relationship between 
average growth rates and the share of capital formation in the GDP.  Finally, Levine and 
Renelt point out that an overwhelming majority of economic and political indicators, 
such as fiscal-expenditure, monetary-policy and political stability indicators are indeed 
not robustly correlated with growth or the capital formation share of the GDP. 
 
 This study is not without limitations, as it does relatively little to estimate 
structural models and establish causality links, rather to simply test whether partial 
correlations commonly mentioned in economic literature are robust to the changes in 
conditioning variables. Although the sample of 119 countries used by Levine and Renelt 
                                                 
5 See p. 1580 
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is large and diverse, this diversity could lead to increasingly rigid criteria for the 
coefficients to be robust.  
 
Overall, there does not seem to be a uniform consent regarding how the openness 
of an economy influences that country’s capital formation and even its overall growth nor 
is there an agreement on how economic openness should be gauged. Furthermore, the 
bulk of related studies is concentrated on attempting to determine a general relationship 
between openness and a nation’s output, often not according enough attention to the 
capital formation alone. The sample selection by most notable studies similarly may pose 
a problem, as the time periods often do not account for the fact that markets become 
increasingly integrated and therefore a more recent data set may reveal trends and 
relationships not present a decade ago. Finally, it is difficult to rely on prior studies for 
the purposes of this research; fairly little attention in the literature has been accorded to 
examining the relationships of interest specifically in the midst of emerging markets 
rather than developing countries, a fairly new concept that materialized as the 
globalization process pressed on.     
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IV. Theoretical Analysis 
 
 
 The model is based upon the framework of general production function with 
constant returns to scale, where the GDP is introduced as a function of capital, labor and 
technology.  
                                                        ),,( TLKfY =                                   (Equation 1) 
In this function, Y is the output (GDP), K is capital, L is labor rand T is technology. In 
this production function, L serves as a proxy for human capital. As Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) note, investment into education and human capital increases production 
efficiency via an increase in worker qualifications. Since our variable of interest is capital 
formation, this function may be rewritten in the following manner: 
                                                       ),,( TLYfK =                                  (Equation 2) 
In agreement with the new growth models, such as the one proposed by Romer (1986), 
technological change is presumed to be endogenous, therefore the openness of an 
economy can be used as a proxy for its level of technology (T): 
                                                       )(OPENfT =  
Where OPEN is a rather simple indicator, gauging the extent of a given country’s 
openness to international trade flows. This indicator is calculated as the ratio of total 
trade volume over the GDP: 
                                                  GDP
XMIMOPEN +=  
Such an indicator implies that an increase in economic openness reflects an 
intensification of a nation’s involvement in international trade. An increase in exports 
provides incentives for domestic technological improvement in order to satisfy foreign 
market’s increasing requirements, whereas in increase in imports stimulates domestic 
economy via increased productivity that stems from the technology entrenched in goods 
coming from abroad. Openness to foreign trade therefore should lead to greater growth 
through increased competition, enhanced efficiency, and the exchange of ideas and 
technology, thus promoting the accumulation of knowledge and human capital (Bregman 
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and Marom, 1993). According to endogenous growth models for consumption goods 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991) and for intermediary goods (Romer,1990), the 
introduction of new imported consumption goods in an economy reduces the cost of 
further R&D and the introduction of new imported intermediary goods raises capital 
formation.  
 
Model Specification 
 
 The empirical model is thus based on Eq. 2 and is specified as follows: 
                        ttttt OPENPOPGDPCAPCAPF εγβαφ ++++=  
In the model above, the variable CAPF is the ratio of capital formation to GDP,  
GDPCAP is GDP per capita, POP is population, OPEN refers to the economic openness 
indicator and εt are the residuals. Provided that the variables in Eq. 2, are capital, output, 
labor and technology, they have been replaced by proxy variables. CAPF is used as a 
proxy for capital (K) and OPEN as a proxy for technological change (T), whereas 
GDPCAP [proxy for output(Y)], and POP [as a proxy for labor (L)] are used as control 
variables. Undergoing a logarithmic transformation, all the variables of the above model 
are measured in terms of their natural logarithms.. The transformed model therefore 
appears as: 
ttttt OPENPOPGDPCAPCAPF εγβαφ ++++= lnlnlnln  
However, as will be shown later in section V, Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (see Tables 
3 and 4) reveal that a unit root exists for some variables and that first-differencing the 
variables remedies that problem of non-stationarity. Consequently, the variables of the 
model are now measured in first differences of logarithm. This new model is specified as 
follows: 
ttttt OPENPOPGDPCAPCAPF εγβαφ +Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ lnlnlnln  
Taking first differences of logarithm not only remedies the non-stationarity problem and 
produces percentage changes of the variables from period to period, but also allows for 
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correcting for the potential problem of linear inter-correlation between the variables, 
should such exist.  
 
To recap, theory suggests that an increase in openness to international trade will 
consequently trigger an increase in capital formation. Nevertheless, some claims such as 
those made by Aitken and Harrison (1999) suggest that increased economic openness will 
lead to an obvious augmentation of international competition, which, in turn, will trigger 
a drop in domestic investment. This diminishment in domestic investment will exceed the 
increase in foreign investment caused by foreign capital inflows, resulting in the overall 
decline of capital formation. In the next section, this study will attempt to determine 
whether the impact of openness on capital formation is significant or not and whether this 
impact is the same for developed countries and emerging markets. Similarly, the nature 
and the sources of collected data, the empirical analysis of the model, and the obtained 
results will be presented and discussed.   
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V. Empirical Analysis 
 
 Data 
 
This study uses a 20-year period for the purposes of analysis, ranging from 1984 
through 2003. As was mentioned earlier, this period is marked by a number of 
multilateral trade agreements and growing economic dependencies between nations 
which contributed to an overall decline of trade barriers worldwide. The variables used 
for each country are the capital formation to GDP ratio [CAPF], population [POP], GDP 
per capita [GDPCAP] and openness to international trade [OPEN]. GDP is calculated for 
each country by first converting the GDP from national currency to US dollars using the 
nominal exchange rate in each period (period average) and then deflated using U.S. 
consumer price index [2000=100]. The gross fixed capital formation for each country is 
similarly converted to USD using nominal exchange rates. CAPF is obtained with both 
variables measured in billions of US dollars. OPEN is calculated with imports, exports 
and GDP all in millions of US dollars. GDPCAP, as well as POP, are integrated in the 
model as control variables. GDPCAP is obtained with both GDP and population 
measured in actual numbers (as opposed to billions or millions). Finally, POP is also 
measured in actual numbers rather than millions. All the data for all periods was obtained 
from the International Financial Statistics database published by the IMF.  
 
Figure 3 below clearly shows the GDP per capita gap between emerging markets 
and developed countries. It is obvious from Figure 3, that despite an accelerated rate of 
growth of capital formation to GDP ratio in the last decade (depicted in Figure 1), 
emerging markets still lag far behind developed nations in terms of GDP per capita, even 
despite the recent global economic recovery from the crisis caused by the 9/11 attacks.  
With the exception of Hungary, which joined the European Union on May 1st, 2004, there 
appears to be little trend for improvement for Thailand and India.   
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FIGURE 3 – GDP per capita in selected countries: 1984-2004 
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It is equally interesting the compare the yearly averages for GDP per capita, population, 
capital formation to GDP ratio and openness indicator between developed nations and 
emerging markets. Table 1 below presents just such a comparison. As expected, 
developed countries were more open to international trade prior to the last decade of the 
20th century. In the 1980’s the average openness of emerging markets began to grow at a 
higher rate than the average openness of developed countries. In 1990, the selected 
emerging markets and developed nations were roughly equal in the extent of their 
openness to international trade. As this trend continued, the average economic openness 
of emerging markets was more than double than the openness of developed countries by 
the end of 2003. 
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TABLE 1 – Comparison of averages between emerging markets and developed countries 
 
                                                 AVERAGES COMPARISON 
  
                          DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES   
                    EMERGING 
MARKETS   
  
GDP per 
Capita Population 
Cap. 
Formation 
/ GDP Openness 
GDP per 
Capita Population 
Cap. 
Formation 
/ GDP Openness 
  
(USD) 
2000=100 (millions) (%)   
(USD) 
2000=100 (millions) (%)   
1984 24144.96 107.34 0.10 0.18 2888.61 270.14 0.09 0.16 
1985 23875.22 108.30 0.11 0.19 2852.42 275.75 0.09 0.16 
1986 24192.71 109.28 0.11 0.20 2966.47 281.43 0.10 0.17 
1987 24953.69 110.26 0.13 0.21 3056.78 287.19 0.11 0.19 
1988 26071.21 111.26 0.14 0.23 3160.39 293.01 0.12 0.22 
1989 25995.81 112.29 0.15 0.25 3170.05 298.89 0.14 0.24 
1990 26334.44 113.33 0.15 0.26 3288.16 304.81 0.17 0.26 
1991 25790.78 114.41 0.15 0.26 3219.78 310.76 0.18 0.30 
1992 25416.39 115.50 0.15 0.28 3302.20 316.75 0.18 0.30 
1993 24214.58 116.61 0.14 0.30 3290.21 322.75 0.19 0.32 
1994 24564.46 117.73 0.15 0.33 3357.09 328.76 0.21 0.36 
1995 25006.07 118.86 0.16 0.37 3389.58 334.75 0.23 0.42 
1996 25335.27 119.99 0.16 0.39 3279.81 340.71 0.24 0.45 
1997 26274.69 121.12 0.17 0.40 2915.40 346.66 0.23 0.54 
1998 26606.59 122.25 0.18 0.41 2523.23 352.57 0.21 0.65 
1999 27255.76 123.38 0.18 0.42 2534.25 358.43 0.21 0.69 
2000 27596.35 124.50 0.19 0.45 2339.30 364.25 0.22 0.85 
2001 27048.01 125.62 0.19 0.43 2320.11 370.01 0.24 0.89 
2002 27671.72 126.74 0.19 0.42 2653.00 375.71 0.25 0.86 
2003 29941.12 127.85 0.19 0.41 3185.17 381.36 0.25 0.89 
 
 
We observe a similar picture when comparing the yearly averages of capital formation as 
a share of GDP. It is evident from Table 1 that capital formation to GDP ratio follows a 
similar trend as openness to international trade: as openness increases at accelerated rates 
in the emerging markets, so does the percentage of GDP represented by capital 
formation, reaching an average of 25% by the end of 2003. While this comparison does 
not provide a definitive answer to our question of interest, it may suggest a positive 
relationship between the extent of foreign market penetration and a share of GDP 
represented by capital formation. 
 
Autocorrelation Tests 
 
Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to conduct autocorrelation tests in 
order to assure that no serial correlation in the residuals takes place. We employ the 
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Breucsh-Godfrey autocorrelation test for this purpose, which is used in order to test for 
higher-order autocorrelation. The test ranges from one to twelve lags under the null 
hypothesis H0: no serial correlation and the test’s results are presented on a country by 
country basis in Table 2 below. 
 
 
TABLE 2– Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test 
 
           Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation  
      
Canada USA U.K. Thailand India Hungary 
0.0612 0.2711 0.0903 0.3762 0.0971 0.0769 
0.0798 0.5106 0.1614 0.0697 0.0627 0.1767 
0.1673 0.7024 0.2671 0.1322 0.1324 0.2865 
0.1078 0.5984 0.2300 0.2303 0.1539 0.1403 
0.0720 0.5709 0.2254 0.3237 0.2424 0.1881 
0.0401* 0.3288 0.0980 0.4155 0.2160 0.0544 
0.0655 0.2572 0.0567 0.4299 0.2544 0.0822 
0.1011 0.3043 0.1210 0.5340 0.2396 0.0637 
0.1357 0.1986 0.0846 0.3103 0.3147 0.0971 
0.1841 0.2221 0.0522 0.2411 0.0921 0.1059 
0.2028 0.2016 0.0623 0.3013 0.1225 0.1486 
0.2322 0.1344 0.0847 0.1215 0.1508 0.1922 
Note: The numbers reported are p-values for the Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test. 
                              *lag 6 – presence of autocorrelation detected.  
 
Using a 5% significance level (α=0.05), we accept the null hypothesis that no serial 
correlation is present for all countries, lag 1 through 12. One exception is present for 
Canada, but however is deemed negligible. This indicates that no further corrections for 
serial correlation are necessary. 
 
 
Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
 
 
Unit root tests are essential in examining the stationarity of a time series, as 
stationarity of regressors is assumed in the derivation of standard inference procedures 
for regression models and non-stationary regressors invalidate many standard results and 
require special treatment. For the purposes of this study, an augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
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will be employed in order to test each series for a presence of a unit root. Adopting the 
methodology of Jin (2004), we begin by regressing each variable on a linear deterministic 
trend, a constant, a dependant lagged variable and q lags of first differences in the 
following manner:  
tqtqtqttttt ελλθλλθλρβαλ +−++−+++= −−−−−− )ln(ln...)ln(lnln 12111  
Where tλ represents the variable of interest (measured in terms of its natural logarithm). 
Following a convention proposed by Jin (2004), in order to render the residuals tε  white 
noise, we set the lag q at two years.  We shall test the null hypothesis H0: ρ=1 which 
indicates a presence of a unit root versus the alternative hypothesis H1: ρ<1, α≠0, β≠0, 
which indicates stationarity. The tests statistics of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test are 
presented in Table 3. With only a few exceptions, most of the variables are non 
stationary, as we cannot reject the null hypothesis that states a presence of a unit root.    
                                                                                                                                 
TABLE 3 – Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root: natural logarithms of variables 
 
                                      Dickey Fuller Test - ln of variables 
Countries         
  OPENNESS CAP. F / GDP
GDP / 
CAPITA POPULATION 
          
Canada -1.12 -4.24 -0.89 -2.24 
USA -0.05 -1.73 -1.52 -0.22 
U.K. -0.95 -5.14 -4.53 -2.23 
Thailand -2.86 -1.91 -1.50 -0.06 
India -1.09 -2.04 -0.80 -2.05 
Hungary -2.58 -2.24 -2.17 -3.81 
                  Note: above are the t-statistics for the Dickey Fuller. The interpolated critical value for the 5% level  
is approximately -3.6 and for the 10% level is approximately -3.24 
 
Provided the presence of non-stationary variables, it is possible to remedy this problem 
via first-differencing. Table 4 presents test statistics of augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on 
the model variables measured in terms of first difference of logarithm. As it becomes 
evident from Table 4, most of the variables test negative for non-stationarity therefore it 
is suitable to employ first-differencing as a means of solving the problem of non-
stationarity. 
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TABLE 4 - Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root: first  
                   differences of the natural logarithms of variables 
  
                               Dickey Fuller Test - First differences 
Countries         
  OPENNESS
CAP. F / 
GDP 
GDP / 
CAPITA POPULATION 
      
Canada -3.70 -4.94 -2.95 -1.90 
USA -3.62 -2.71 -4.56 -3.81 
U.K. -4.66 -3.84 -1.74 -4.24 
Thailand -5.61 -3.71 -3.77 -3.68 
India -4.60 -4.52 -3.64 -1.29 
Hungary -3.79 -3.61 -3.87 -3.74 
                  Note: above are the t-statistics for the Dickey Fuller. The interpolated critical value for the 5% level 
                  is approximately -3.6 and for the 10% level is approximately -3.24 
 
Another concern that arises is that variables that possess a unit root share a 
common stochastic tendency. If this be the case, there exists a long term equilibrium 
relationship between the variables, thus a linear combination between two variables from 
non-stationary series is itself stationary. In this case, differentiating the variables leads to 
a model misspecification and corrective measures should be undertaken. In order to 
verify if this is actually the case, we employ the Engle and Granger test, a cointegration 
test. The test consists of two steps: we begin by estimating the following equation: 
ttttt uXXXtX +++++= 453423211 lnlnlnln ααααα  
Where Xt are our variables of interest for each country, ranging from one to four and μt is 
white noise. The second step is to predict the residuals for this model and then test the 
residuals for the presence of a unitary root using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test  
(setting lags to two). The results of the Engle-Granger test are presented in Table 5 
below.  
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TABLE 5 – Engle-Granger test for cointegration  
                                         Engle-Granger Test  
Countries         
  OPENNESS
CAP. F / 
GDP 
GDP / 
CAPITA POPULATION 
          
Canada -3.511 -2.282 -2.806 -3.046 
USA -2.991 -1.829 -1.957 -1.361 
U.K. -1.654 -1.107 -1.789 -2.414 
Thailand -2.156 -2.475 -2.357 -2.539 
India -3.423 -2.722 -3.109 -1.612 
Hungary -3.158 -1.335 -2.362 -1.070 
             Note: below are the t-statistics for the Engle-Granger. According to McKinnon (1991), the critical 
                 value for the 10% level is approximately -4.79 
 
As may be observed, no variables are cointegrated, since the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration (H0: ρ=1) cannot be rejected for all variables at a 5% significance level, 
therefore including a correction term in the model is not necessary and the use of first-
differencing is suitable for conducting the regressions.     
 
Vector Autoregression 
 
In order to establish causality and to determine whether a feedback effect is 
present, a vector autoregression was conducted. The results, concentrating on the two 
variables of interest are presented in Table 6 below. 
 
TABLE 6 – Vector Autoregression Results  
      Vector Autoregression    
       
  Canada 
United 
States 
United 
Kingdom India Thailand Hungary
       
Openness* 0.675 0.243 0.858 0.034† 0.012† 0.038† 
       
Capital Formation / 
GDP** 0.046† 0.152 0.489 0.402 0.085 0.079 
              
*Effect of openness on capital formation share of GDP     
**Effect of capital formation share of GDP on openness     
† Significant at a 5 % level       
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These results indicate that in the case of India, Thailand and the Hungary the effect of 
openness on capital formation is significant, while in the case of Canada, the effect of 
capital formation on openness appears to be significant. The latter effect may easily be 
attributed to the fact that an increase in capital formation creates favorable condition for 
export-oriented multinational corporations. These multinationals thrive on cheap labor 
and attractive tax legislations, increasing exports and therefore inflating the openness 
indicator used throughout this study. All the same, a vector autoregression is not without 
shortcomings. It is important to note that causal relationships may appear distorted due to 
a problem which often persists when dealing with causality and distributed lag models: 
degrees of freedom are depleted and otherwise significant relationships may appear 
insignificant. 
 
Regression Results 
 
Table 7 below presents the results from individual regressions that were 
conducted using the model specified earlier in section IV. 
 
TABLE 7 - Individual regression results 
 
      GDP per capita Population Openness Adj.R2
EMERGING MARKETS         
Thailand   0.86* 9.48 0.68* 0.70 
   (0.1610433) (7.909172) (0.199301)  
India   0.52* 13.98* 0.41* 0.43 
   (0.195819) (5.682176) (0.1648115)  
Hungary   0.17 -0.36 0.53* 0.47 
   (0.2084221) (9.049008) (0.1513508)  
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES         
       
USA   0.75** 27.03** 0.19** 0.39 
   (0.401895) (14.08747) (0.1055253)  
Canada   0.52** 8.71 0.16 0.12 
   (0.291503) (6.45699) (0.2376234)  
U.K.   0.57* -71.88** 0.45 0.47 
      (0.230715) (36.44356) (0.2847851)   
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets.     
*Significant at 5% level      
**Significant at 10% level      
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              The regression results suggest that openness to international trade bears positive 
effects on the rate of growth of capital formation for both developed countries and 
emerging markets. These effects are statistically significant for all of the emerging 
markets at a 5% significance level. However, as for the developed countries, while 
Canada and the United Kingdom do not present any significant effects of openness, the 
impact of openness is significant at a 10% level in the case of United States. The results 
obtained for India, Thailand and Hungary are consistent with the results obtained by 
Levine and Renelt (1992) who found a robust positive relationship between openness to 
international trade and the rate of growth of capital formation. It is important to note, that 
the model does indeed present a better fit in the case of emerging markets as it may be 
noted from the more elevated adjusted R2. 
 
As expected, the openness coefficients for the emerging markets are found to be 
on the average higher than those of developed countries, as greater economic openness 
observed for the emerging markets is likely to attract direct foreign investments. 
Similarly, given that the economic openness indicator serves as a proxy for gauging the 
presence of trade barriers, foreign and domestically-owned manufacturers and service 
providers are likely to flourish in the now more open emerging markets, provided 
relatively low labor costs and tax liabilities. All the coefficients for openness appear 
positive, which is indeed the expected outcome predicted by theory. Although certain 
studies6 suggest that increased openness to international trade is indeed harmful for some 
developing countries whose economies are unable to compete internationally, this is most 
certainly not the case of emerging markets.  
 
 As was pointed out earlier, the year 1990 was roughly the time when the average 
economic openness of emerging markets rivaled the openness of developed countries. 
Similarly, the rate of growth of openness in the emerging markets generally started 
exceeding the rate of growth of openness in the developed nations around the mid-to-late 
1980’s. A similar trend ensues for the capital formation as a percentage of the GDP, 
albeit to a lesser magnitude. There are a number of plausible explanations for such a trend 
                                                 
6 See Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
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in the emerging markets, chiefly the restructuring of these markets in order to meet the 
standards and demands of foreign investors and to be able to compete internationally. In 
Hungary, the former Eastern block economy has conducted its trade reforms most 
swiftly: between 1989 and 1991, Hungary has completely abrogated the state monopoly 
on foreign trade. A vast majority of imports was liberated from licenses and quotas and 
the average tariff rate was lowered significantly. Further restructuring and adjustments 
ensued, as Hungary has engaged in new trade opportunities, particularly with the 
European Union, the European Free Trade Association and its partners in the Central 
European Free Trade Agreement. 1991 was equally an important year for India, when the 
economic reform process has put an end to investment, industrial and import licensing, 
and ended public sector monopoly in many sectors, thereby allowing automatic approval 
of foreign direct investment. Still, unlike Hungary, India remains a mixed economy, 
displaying a relatively high degree of protection. Foreign direct investment inflows 
remain at comparatively low levels, depriving India of extra impulses necessary for 
growth and competitiveness on world markets. This accounts for the fact that India’s 
openness coefficient, as obtained by the regression, is smaller than in the case of Hungary 
and Thailand as well as for the fact that India’s growth in capital formation as a share of 
GDP does not correspond to the growth in its openness.  
 
Another reason behind larger size and higher significance of openness coefficients 
for emerging markets is indubitably the technological progress, particularly the advances 
in telecommunications and information technologies, as well as the surfacing of the 
internet. Along side the restructuring of the markets, such technological advances were 
made accessible through the liberalization of trade and in turn have greatly expanded the 
horizons of foreign direct investment and international trade in these countries via 
financial markets expansion, resulting in a surge of investments pouring in. At its 
pinnacle, this tendency is reflected by Thailand’s capital formation reaching nearly 40% 
of its GDP circa 1996. While the emerging markets were seen as potential but unstable 
goldmines by many western investors, not much has changed in the midst of the already 
developed economies, where the technological advances did not have such a drastic 
introduction as a consequence of trade liberalization and changes in the market structure. 
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Further research geared on determining the effects of technological advances in the fields 
of telecommunications and information technology on economic openness and capital 
formation in the emerging markets is necessary in order to fully substantiate this 
suggestion.  
 
 The openness coefficients are found to be positive for both emerging markets and 
developed countries, which contradicts Aitken and Harrison’s (1999) argument that an 
increase in openness suppresses domestic investment via increased competition and that 
the increase in foreign direct investment is not sufficient to make up for the loss of 
domestic investment, thus total capital formation decreases. The nature of the standalone 
impact of an increase in openness on domestic and on foreign investment is difficult to 
determine, thus it is unclear whether domestic investment in the emerging markets is 
robust to foreign competition or whether the increase in foreign direct investment simply 
makes up for the decrease in domestic investment. However, the fact that no openness 
coefficient is significant at a five percent level in the case of developed countries leads to 
suspect that despite an openness-fuelled inflow of foreign investments into these 
countries, a decrease in domestic investment took place as local firms had a difficult time 
facing foreign competition from firms who take advantage of lower labor costs, safety 
and emission standards, and finally lower corporate tax rates.   
 
As for the control variables in the regressions, it de rigueur to note that the GDP 
per capita coefficients are found to be positive for all nations and significant at a 5 
percent level  for India, Thailand and United Kingdom and significant at a 10 percent 
level for USA and Canada. Since the GDP per capita is being used as a proxy for output, 
it is natural to expect that an increase in the rate of growth of GDP per capita will lead to 
an increase in the rate of growth of capital formation, as capital formation is an integral 
part of the GDP. This finding is more accurate for emerging markets than for the 
developed countries, which is substantiated by the fact that capital formation represents a 
larger share of GDP in the emerging markets and thus the GDP of emerging markets is 
more sensitive to fluctuations in capital formation. Finally, the coefficients for POP, 
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representing the rate of population growth and being used as a proxy for labor (L), are 
found to be significant at a 5 percent level for India and at a 10 percent level for the 
United States and the United Kingdom – the nations with the largest populations. As may 
be seen from Figure 4 below, both United States and India experienced higher population 
growth rates from 1984 to 2004 than other countries in the sample. 
 
FIGURE 4 – Population growth in selected countries: 1984-2004 
Population
0.0000
200.0000
400.0000
600.0000
800.0000
1000.0000
1200.0000
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Canada
U.S.A.
United Kingdom
India
Hungary
Thailand
 
In the case of United Kingdom and Hungary, however, the population coefficients are 
found to be negative, which may be explained by labor inefficiencies. It is necessary to 
point out that certain earlier studies, such as Jin (2004), found similar negative 
relationships between labor and economic growth.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 
This study attempts to gauge the effect of openness to international trade on 
capital formation and to determine whether such an impact is different for emerging 
markets than it is for developed countries. For comparison purposes, this study selects 
Thailand, Hungary and India as emerging markets and United States, Canada and the 
United Kingdom as developed nations. Measuring capital formation in terms of its share 
of GDP and measuring openness to international trade as a ratio of total trade to GDP, 
individual time-series regressions were conducted for each of the selected countries. The 
findings reveal that openness to international trade has a positive effect on capital 
formation in both developed countries and emerging markets. Openness coefficients are 
statistically significant at a 5 percent level for all the countries classified as emerging 
markets, while only significant  for the United States at a 10 percent level and not 
significant for Canada and United Kingdom. This relationship is stronger for emerging 
markets, as may be seen from the generally higher coefficients. The model certainly 
presents a better fit when applied to emerging markets: the adjusted R2 suggests that on 
average, in the case of emerging markets, 53 percent of the variation of capital formation 
is explained by the selected variables, whereas this number is only 33 percent in the case 
of developed countries. 
 
There are a number of plausible rationalizations that could potentially explain the 
fact that openness bears a more significant effect on capital formation in the case of 
emerging markets. First, restructuring and changes in policy direction have led to more 
investor-favorable market conditions in the emerging markets, as it is reflected by an 
increase in the openness indicator. This increased openness, combined with reduced 
corruption and increased accountability has attracted flows of foreign investments, 
notably from foreign manufacturers and service providers who benefit from relatively 
low labor costs and tax legislations as well private and institutional investors from the 
West who took advantage of the financial markets liberalization. The rush of foreign 
direct investment into these countries has naturally increased their capital formation. 
Second, relatively recent advances in the fields of information and telecommunications 
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technology, as well as the emergence of the internet coincide with a general increase in 
openness in the midst of emerging markets. This suggests that such technology has 
facilitated and encouraged foreign direct investment into the emerging markets, as many 
forms of foreign investment would simply not be possible today without the use of 
information and telecommunications technologies. Such was not the case in the 
developed countries, where radical market restructuring was not necessary and thus did 
not take place. While protectionist policies were being curtailed and the said advances in 
the information and telecommunication technologies did increase openness significantly, 
the flow of investment was directed outwards to the emerging markets. It should not be 
surprising that increased openness did not have significant effects on capital formation in 
the developed countries: even though these now more open economies did attract 
investments from abroad, lower labor costs and standards, as well as corporate tax rates 
in the developing countries have made it difficult for local firms to face foreign 
competition, thereby reducing domestic investment and in turn, reducing national capital 
formation. This may suggest that recent speculations regarding the economic dangers of 
outsourcing are perhaps not unfounded.  
 
This study is not without shortcomings. Its main limitation is that it does not 
explicitly separate capital formation into domestic and foreign investment7, which 
renders a judgment on the nature of the impact of openness difficult to pass. Although 
outside the scope of this study, considering domestic and foreign direct investment 
separately would certainly shed more light on the effects of technological spillover that 
stems from the international transfer of goods and services, as it is outlined by 
endogenous technological change theories. Moreover, it would permit to further 
investigate the reasons behind a lower significance of the openness coefficients in the 
case of developed countries and to empirically substantiate the suggestion that a decrease 
in domestic investment created by an increase of foreign competition is what causes this 
lower significance. Finally, a potential drawback of not separating capital formation into 
domestic and foreign investment is that the rationale behind the impact of openness is 
based largely on theoretical rather than on empirical grounding. Another shortcoming of 
                                                 
7 Foreign direct investment can be used as a proxy for capital markets openness.  
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this study lies in the fact that no special attention is given to considering the standalone 
effects of the advances in the telecommunication and IT fields on openness and foreign 
investment8. Further research in this field would be essential in order to determine the 
role of communications technology in the economic development of emerging markets. 
Last but not least, the measure of economic openness used in this study may prove not to 
be sufficient in order to reflect the openness of capital markets, which, plays an integral 
part in determining the flows of foreign direct investment. The use of an additional 
indicator that gauges the extent of capital markets’ liberalization would thus prove 
beneficial for further research in this field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 See Mattoo, A.; Rathindran, R.; Subramanian, A. (2001). 
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